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INTRODUCTION
This article discusses, in some detail, the main policy and regulatory evolutions
in Europe up until February 2007, which are intended to contribute significantly
to the introduction of systems and services relying on flexible spectrum
management. Although business stakeholders as well as many academics
consider necessary regulatory reform as a volatile and thus uncertain
requirement for innovation, these reforms do not come about because of
themselves. This is to say, policy action is in most cases undertaken as a result
of constituency pressure, and information as well as persuasion flows,
particularly in highly specialised and technical domains, guide the policy process
throughout its conception, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases
(Hogwood and Gunn 1984; Dunn 2004). On the other hand, cabinets and
administrations, which are sufficiently sensitive to future policy requirements
and have the resources to exploit this sensitivity, may well devise policy and
regulatory reforms well before an industry consensus around them takes shape.
In other words, the policy trends discussed in this paper are in most cases a mix
of Government initiatives and a reaction to industry demands. Modern policy
processes often provide both formal and informal channels through which
stakeholders may influence these processes.
One difficulty of studying issues of spectrum policy in the European Union (EU) is
that this policy domain is largely a competence of the Member States. The 2002
Radio Spectrum Decision of the European Commission did create a framework for
EU-wide spectrum policy making aimed at ensuring “co-ordination of policy
approaches and, where appropriate, harmonised conditions with regard to the
availability and efficient use of radio spectrum necessary for the establishment
and functioning of the internal market in Community policy areas, such as
electronic communications, transport and R&D” (Radio Spectrum Decision,
Preamble 2), but the Commission has no spectrum to manage of its own and, as
the preamble points out, continuously needs to ensure that its policy initiatives
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are in line with the competences attributed to it by the Treaties.
1
As a
consequence, the European Commission is very much dependent upon the
Member States when it comes to the conception, implementation and monitoring
of its Union-wide policy measures. A first instrument of co-ordination is the Radio
Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG), set up in 2002, which consists of high level
experts from national administrations as well as a diverse set of observers. Via
the adoption of opinions and the organisation of consultations in preparation of
such opinions, the RSPG, for which the Commission serves as secretariat, advises
the Commission on issues of radio spectrum policy, co-ordination of policy
approaches and efficient use of radio spectrum. (European Commission 2002,
2007a; RSPG 2007). A second forum for inter-level deliberation, mainly aimed at
the formulation of technical implementing measures, is the so-called comitology
procedure, specifically through the Radio Spectrum Committee (RSC) which is
composed of representatives of the Member States and is in liaison with the
different national authorities responsible for spectrum management; this
committee is shared by a representative from the European Commission. A third
way of co-operation is the issuing of mandates by the Commission (via the RSC)
to the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations
(CEPT), which again consists of representatives of 47 national administrations –
thus transcending by far the Union’s membership;
2
these mandates, for which
procedures are outlined both in the Radio Spectrum Decision (Art. 4 §3) and in a
Memorandum of Understanding signed in January 2004 between the Commission
and the CEPT (European Commission 2004a), deal with the harmonisation of
frequency allocation, the availability of information and other measures for
technical implementation. Finally, yet equally important, it is the Member States
which are responsible for the transposition of any Directives resulting from all of
the above policy-making mechanisms,
3
giving them a certain degree of flexibility
as to the timing and the specific implementation of EU-wide spectrum policies.
Moreover, the day-to-day administration of spectrum also resides with the
different National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) for spectrum management, and
9
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1 Preamble 7 of the Radio Spectrum Decision repeats this requirement very clearly: “Where it is necessary to adopt
harmonisation measures for the implementation of Community policies which go beyond technical implementing
measures, the Commission may submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a proposal on the basis of
the Treaty.”
2 http://www.cept.org
3 As opposed to Commission Decisions, such as those adopted by the RSC, which have to be implemented as such and
are directly applicable.
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issues such as assignment and licensing procedures, or the decision whether to
use competitive selection procedures for the assignment of radio frequencies, as
well as audiovisual policies remain under the exclusive competence of the
Member States.
The outline above is not intended to give an exhaustive overview of EU spectrum
policy competences and procedures. What it aims to prove is that, for a significant
part of the spectrum policy domain, there is no such thing as a European policy, even
when taking into account all the harmonisation, consultation and planning
procedures that are inherent to this specific policy domain and that take place not
only on a regional, European level, but also on a multi-regional and global scale (eg
via the ITU and its World or Regional Radio Conferences). Where EU-wide
frameworks are created, national administrations – except in the case of
Commission Decisions – have room for influencing policies and for implementing
them according to their own time scheme and local priorities. Nevertheless, a
number of trends in European spectrum policy are clearly visible, and are being
implemented both on a EU-level (by launching consultations, creating regulatory
frameworks and / or taking specific and binding measures for them) and by the
Member States. In the sections below, some of these trends, which are of significant
importance for the successful introduction of reconfigurable wireless systems, will
be discussed. One of these is the introduction of spectrum trading, or secondary
trading of spectrum; another is the evolution towards more dynamic forms of
spectrum management which, on a Community level, is currently being given shape
by the so-called Wireless Access Policy for Electronic Communications Services
(WAPECS). As mentioned, it is impossible to draw out detailed policy roadmaps for
these principles as this would imply a description of 25 Member States’ policies.
Therefore we shall limit ourselves in this article to the Community-wide policy
evolutions in these two domains, complemented by the current situation in some
Member States, particularly the UK and Germany.
THE INTRODUCTION OF SPECTRUM TRADING
The introduction of spectrum tradeability constitutes significant evolution in
spectrum policy, which is of great importance in the context of reconfigurable
networks and services. As the European Commission puts it, “the concept of
spectrum markets is a radical shift in how spectrum could be managed in Europe”
(European Commission 2007a). Indeed, in some countries, for more than a 100 years
spectrum management has followed a so-called command and control model. 
10
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In its most traditional form, this model means that administrations are both
responsible for negotiating frequency allocations internationally, and deciding on
precise usage of the bands as well as on the users permitted to use the frequencies
(assignment).
4
When there is spectrum scarcity, a beauty contest (ie a competition
where frequencies are awarded based on what is considered to be the “best” offer,
usually defined by a number of quantitative and / or qualitative criteria, and thus
unlike an auction where the price offered is primordial) is usually held to decide who
receives a licence to use the spectrum. In a market with relatively few players, this
was (and still is) a system which gives administrations maximal knowledge on
spectrum activity, relatively large degrees of control over spectrum usage and
moreover minimised interference between services making use of spectrum.
However, many problems have arisen with this dirigiste approach to spectrum
management. Particularly in the US, beauty contests started to be challenged in
court as demand started to outweigh supply, and were gradually replaced, first by
lotteries and eventually by auctions. As a consequence, beauty contests became
considered as being too unpredictable and, in those countries where the command
and control system was applied, this system was criticised for the perceived
slowness and inherent inflexibility with which government administrations manage
the spectrum, resulting in tardy adaptations to technological innovation, heavy
influencing by lobbying and an excessive emphasis on avoiding interference, leading
to suboptimal use of spectrum; moreover some authors claim that governments,
unlike private companies, do not have the incentive to find the most efficient and
popular use for spectrum, because contrary to enriching them (as it would private
entities) such modifications only imply a higher workload for these administrations
(Benjamin 2003; Analysis & Partners 2004; Ofcom 2005b; WIK 2006).
The introduction of auctions marked the start of a second model for spectrum
management, namely market mechanisms.
5
As the FCC already pointed out in 1999,
11
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4 To this could be added that, at least at the international level (particularly within CEPT) as well as within a number
of regulators formerly making use of a command-and-control model stricto sensu, this model has by now evolved
into what regulators prefer to call a negotiations and consensus model, in which discussions and negotiations are
taking place between the various stakeholders (including the national spectrum agencies, manufacturers,
operators, representatives of governmental use (eg: civil aviation, scientific, maritime, military), in order to find
national, regional and/or global agreements on the nature and the conditions of the use of a particular frequency
band, and in which consensus between these stakeholders is envisioned.
5 WIK (2006) gives a description of different kinds of auctions at pp. 31-33. Many economic theories exist concerning
the advantages and disadvantages of auctions over other ways of assignment. However, such analysis of different
modes of initial assignment is outside the scope of this article.
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the idea behind this is that “efficient spectrum markets will lead to use of spectrum
for the highest value end use” (FCC 1999:32), because the parties that have
identified the highest value (ie revenues) for the spectrum will be willing to pay the
most for it, and will win the auction. A second step in this process is to allow
obtained spectrum licenses to be traded between players, meaning that spectrum
usage rights are transferred from one party to another in a secondary market.
6
The
economic significance of this is that, apart from confronting the cost of acquiring
spectrum through an auction, the licensee also needs to address the cost of retaining
its spectrum, and will not do so if its value is suboptimal, leading to more efficient
use of frequencies (WIK 2006:12). A principle often quoted to denote the importance
of tradeability of spectrum is the Coase theorem, which states that
“the initial allocation of a good does not matter from an efficiency perspective so
long as property rights are clearly defined and the goods can be freely exchanged –
because, provided that there are no frictions in the trading process, exchange will
lead to an efficient outcome” (Coase 1961, quoted in Analysis & Partners 2004:20).
In order to further optimise efficiency, Administrative Incentive Pricing may be
applied to the ownership of licences; in such a regime, contrary to mere cost-
recovery pricing, usage fees for spectrum are periodically levied which reflect the
opportunity cost associated with the spectrum, so that the licence owner is again
confronted with the cost of retaining his spectrum (WIK 2006:37; Marcus et al
2005:22) To be able to do this, of course, implies that an exact definition of usage
rights, in all its aspects, is given.
7
Also, government intervention might be needed to
deal with possible market failures which undermine the basic validity of the Coase
theorem, such as excessive transaction costs impeding efficient trade to take place
(eg when interference requirements are unclear, leading to costly negotiations, or
when a large operator needs to buy spectrum from many small users), the fact that
willingness to pay might not be identical to social value of the service offered, or the
positive and negative externalities which might be associated to the use of certain
frequencies (such as public policy objectives) (Analysis & Partners 2004:21-22).
A third and final model gaining popularity is the commons model, also known as the
open access, unlicensed or licence-exempt model. In this model, administrations
only decide on the designation of the spectrum to a certain type of application or
system (usually complemented by a set of usage conditions), after which all users
12
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6 ie a market which exists after the initial selling of goods in a primary market (in this case, the initial assignment of
spectrum to a certain party).
7 A comprehensive list of criteria to be identified is given by WIK (2006) pp. 15-17.
008 29 simonSAJIC 01.qxp  2008/04/03  02:27 PM  Page 12
are free to use such technology in the prescribed frequency band. Instead of being
protected from interference through the designation of licensed operators, technical
requirements imposed, for example upon equipment, intend to limit this
interference. The commons model has become particularly popular with the advent
of various technologies for short-range, low-power communications, such as WiFi
and Bluetooth, and is furthermore mainly used for smaller-scale, non-commercial
applications (Analysis & Partners 2004:26). Many – although not all
8
– authors agree,
however, that an exclusive usage right will remain essential for services that require
very high investments and therefore demand guaranteed capacity as well as
protection from interference and that, insofar as sufficient spectrum is freed up for
licence-exempt use (which, at least according to Ofcom,
9
is not very far from the
actual allocation today), when there is sufficient spectrum available for licence-
exempt use, market forces should be the guiding principle for the assignment of
usage rights (WIK 2006:8; Ofcom 2005b:5). In this article we therefore limit ourselves
to the discussion of policy steps towards these market based principles. However, we
do come back to this balance between different models of spectrum management in
the concluding section of this article.
TABLE 1: OFCOM’S PLANNED REBALANCE OF MANAGEMENT SCHEMES
Command and Control The Market Licence Exempt
1995 95.8% 0.0% 4.2%
2000 95.8% 0.0% 4.2%
2005 67.8% 27.1% 4.2%
2010 22.1% 73.7% 4.2%
As with flexible spectrum usage, several countries inside as well as outside of the EU
are currently taking steps to introduce secondary trading. In the UK, for example,
Ofcom has outlined a roadmap towards assigning almost three quarters of the
spectrum via market mechanisms (see Table 1 taken from Ofcom 2005a:12). To this
end, a consultation was organised at the end of 2003, a statement published in
August of 2004 and draft spectrum regulations (again followed by consultation)
released in the second half of that year. Also, the mentioned Spectrum Framework
Review of November 2004 and its Implementation Plan of January 2005 dealt with
13
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8 In his article on spectrum abundance, Benjamin refers to a number of advocates of open-spectrum access on a
massive scale, such as Yochai Benkler, George Gilder and Eli. M. Noam.
9 The French administration shares this view.
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the issue. The Spectrum Trading Statement contained a class-by-class timetable for
the introduction of spectrum trading, which can be found in Table 2 taken from
Ofcom (2005c:8), and the regulator indicates that, at least as far as 2004 and 2005
are concerned, it is on schedule with this time plan. As for the introduction of
spectrum trading in other than the 2G and 3G bands, Ofcom hopes to have cleared
out most of the policy and technical issues by the end of 2006. Also, in order to
improve the functioning of the spectrum market, the regulator has committed itself
to providing up-to-date information to stakeholders on what allocations and
assignments have been made, as well as whether or not these are tradeable. For this,
three registers exist: the UK Plan for Frequency Authorisation (UK PFA), providing
contextual information about which frequencies are available for assignment, for
what purpose the different frequencies have been allocated and whether these can
be traded; the Wireless Telegraphy Act register (WTR), providing basic information
about individual licences, and the Transfer Notification Register (TNR), displaying
details of proposed trades notified to Ofcom, trades in progress and completed
trades (Ofcom 2007).
TABLE 2: OFCOM TIMETABLE FOR SPECTRUM TRADING INTRODUCTION
2004 2005 2006 2007 other
Analogue Public Wide area Emergency 2G and 3G mobile Mobile satellite
Access Mobile Private Business services
Radio (PAMR) Radio (PBR) 
National paging On-site PBR Programme Satellite shared
Makers and with terrestrial
Special Events services
(PMSE)
Data networks Digital PAMR Aviation and Radio
maritime broadcasting
communication
National and 10GHz FWA Radio navigation Television 
regional PBR (Radar) broadcasting
Common Base 32Ghz
Stations
Fixed Wireless   40GHz
Access (FWA)
Scanning telemetry
Fixed terrestrial links
14
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In the US – which, in part because of its limited number of neighbours, great land
mass, homogenous and large internal market, has always been a hotbed for
innovation in spectrum management – the FCC has been contemplating spectrum
trading as early as 1980. In 2000, the Commission released a Policy Statement on
Secondary Markets, indicating its desire to move towards market-based mechanisms
for spectrum management, while noting that considerable degrees of flexibility
already existed at that time (such as the already mentioned xG mobile networks,
satellite broadcasting and Private Land Mobile Radio Services. (WIK 2006:110).
10
Similarly, The Spectrum Efficiency Working Group recommended in 2002 that 
“the Commission fundamentally alter the existing balance among these models –
which is dominated by legacy command-and-control regulation – by expanding the
use of both the exclusive use and commons models throughout the spectrum, and
limiting the use of the command-and-control model to those instances where there
are compelling public policy reasons” 
and further stated that 
“the exclusive use model should be applied to significant parts of the spectrum,
particularly in bands where scarcity is relatively high and the transaction costs
associated with market-based negotiation of access rights are relatively low. Where
spectrum is scarce but transaction costs are high, the exclusive use model still may
be most appropriate, since wherever scarcity exists, there will be competing claims
to this resource, and the exclusive use model is most effective at balancing these
claims.” (FCC 2002:32). 
Consequently the FCC’s First and Second Report and Order on Secondary Markets,
released in 2003 and 2004 respectively, greatly simplified already existing transfer
as well as leasing procedures for a wide range of so-called Wireless Radio Services
(WRS) and gradually extended these bands, strongly reducing Commission
intervention in many of these transfer or leasing processes (FCC 2003, 2004). As far
as this leasing is concerned, two options are possible: either a spectrum manager
lease takes place, without prior approval by the FCC, in which the licensee retains
both de jure control over the licence and de facto control over the leased spectrum,
or a de facto transfer lease is concluded – with FCC approval – in which the lessee
takes control over the spectrum for the duration of the lease (either short or long
term) and is primarily liable towards the FCC for compliance with regulations.
(Ofcom 2005b:60; FCC 2003:93-182). So far, the system seems to have promoted
efficiency without causing adverse side effects (WIK 2006:135). 
15
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10 Interestingly, the BNetzA report (see p 114) quotes a Commissioner saying that at the time, thousands of licenced
transfers were already be pprocessed by the FCC every year.
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The European Commission has followed these trends, taking steps to create a
regulatory framework for the introduction of spectrum trading. First of all, the (non-
obligatory) possibility to introduce secondary trading was included in the new
regulatory framework (Art. 9 §3), which was approved in 2002 and came into force in
July 2003. As is the case with flexibility of usage rights, the Commission’s specific
approach then started with the request for an RSPG Opinion, made to the Group in
August 2003. This request clearly referred to evolutions within Member States (notably
in the UK and in Germany) as well as outside the EU (US and Australia)
11
, and the 
e-Europe and Lisbon strategy objectives as arguments for EU policy in spectrum
trading (European Commission, 2003). Between February and April 2004, the RSPG
launched a public consultation on the topic, which spurred 27 responses, mostly from
vendors, broadcasters, telecoms operators and industry interest groups (RSPG 2004a).
In parallel, a study was made by Analysys Consulting, DotEcon, Hogan and Hartson,
which was completed in May 2004. The study revealed that, at the moment of its release,
one third of the Member States had either not implemented measures for secondary
trading or were not planning to do so, and that there were divergent opinions on the
benefits of such measures and the possible side effects relating for example to
competition. (Analysis & Partners 2004:163-169). It therefore recommended that the
Commission take steps to obligate spectrum trading (and liberalisation) in Member
States in all its possible forms, whilst leaving the specific implementation of such
introduction to the MSs, because this would bring significant welfare benefits to the EU
which would by far outweigh the additional costs of, for example, monitoring and
mitigating interference. Still according to the report, a Community-wide approach was
necessary in order to ensure that innovative companies could deploy their activities in
a sufficiently large market by acquiring spectrum in different Member States;
furthermore, Member States should further have the right to reclaim spectrum usage
rights, for example in order to harmonise usage of bands on an EU-level, and should
publish clear registers of both spectrum assignments and trades. Finally, in order to
maximise benefits, a harmonised approach to the selection of suitable bands for
secondary trading was suggested (Analysis & Partners 2004:265-272)].
12
16
the southern african journal of information and communication issue 8 2007
11 References are made to the FCC Task Force On Spectrum Policy, to Ofcom’s Spectrum Framework Review, to the
mentioned study of WIK for BNetzA in Germany. Specifically with regard to the US, a quote from a speech in
Washington by former Information Society Commissioner Liikanen is also included: “In Europe we have a legacy of
different national measures and approaches which are still standing in the way of many of the possible innovative
approaches to spectrum management. That said, it is imperative that we advance and we can learn from the US.
Jointly we should be able to develop a series of innovative approaches which are of interest world-wide”.
12 A proposed set of suitable bands is also outlined in this section of the report. 
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In November 2004 the RSPG published its Opinion. The document starts off with
some reserve, stating that spectrum trading 
“could be beneficial in certain parts of the spectrum, provided that sufficient
safeguards are implemented by administrations to ensure that the potential
benefits of this introduction are not offset by adverse consequences [and that]
European harmonisation of spectrum trading rules should not be considered until
Member States have greater experience of secondary trading, because such rules
might delay the developments in countries where secondary trading is being
introduced and might have negative impact in countries that are more hesitant”. 
The opinion advocates a phased introduction of spectrum trading in a number of
bands, with a certain degree of commonality between the approaches of the
different Member States, while excluding trading (or only allowing it after careful
studies) from other bands where benefits are lower and/or risks or practical
difficulties are higher; these include the bands used for government, broadcasting
and scientific purposes. Besides stressing the continued role of CEPT in
harmonising bands and commenting on usage rights, the Opinion also sets out four
possible areas for action at EU level: 1) monitoring of roll-out and implementation
of secondary trading by the RSPG; 2) sharing of knowledge and best practices
between the Commission, the Member States and spectrum users on secondary
trading experience, definition of spectrum rights and obligations, interference
management etc; 3) giving consideration to ways in which licences may be made
more flexible and technology-neutral in pursuing harmonisation objectives, taking
into account the work of the CEPT’s ECC/PT8 project team; 4) considering, through
RSPG and RSC, the scope for a common approach to national information
requirements for trading, with specific attention to the potential role of the
European Frequency Information System, a database hosted since 2002 by the
European Radiocommunications Office
13 
(RSPG 2004b).
Looking at these rather cautious findings from the RSPG regarding a European
approach to secondary trading, it may come as no surprise that the Commission did
not immediately – as the Analysys study had recommended – draft binding
measures, but instead first published a Communication on the issue in September
2005, entitled A Market Based Approach to Spectrum Management in the
European Union. In this document, the Commission announces its target to put into
practice both secondary trading and flexible spectrum usage in the entire EU by
17
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2010, by implementing regulatory measures in the course of the review of the
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, as well
as by starting a co-ordination process to avoid delays and spectrum fragmentation
in the period leading to a harmonised European framework. The main argument
given by the Commission to start a harmonised approach, besides the achievement
of Lisbon and 2010 strategies, is that diverging Member States’ (MS) policies
continue to limit the development of the internal market and, thus, reduce the
expected full benefits brought by secondary trading and flexible use.
14
The decision
by one MS not to introduce spectrum reforms, so the Commission argues, will create
costs for other MSs, whereas when one country would reform its policies, this would
cause benefits for all other MSs. Moreover, “introducing spectrum tradability at EU
level would bring about the conditions for seamless cross-border services on the
basis of rules applied throughout the Community and create one of the world’s
largest markets in spectrum-supported services. It would rapidly improve the
competitive position of the EU and deliver a strong impetus to innovation.”
15
Therefore, six issues are proposed on which a European concensus is needed. The
first is the objective, namely the introduction of spectrum trading and flexible use by
2010. The second aspect is the spectrum bands involved: here, the Commission
strongly argues for the involvement of a wide set of frequencies,
16
but excluding
defence, scientific or globally managed (eg aviation and satellite) services. A third
18
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14 The Analysis et al study expected these to amount to EU8-9 billion per year, whereas another mentioned study by
Jerry Ellig from the George Mason University calculated an annual gain of USD 77 billion in the US, claiming that
“spectrum allocation accounts for more than two-thirds of the total costs of federal telecommunications regulation
to consumers and society.”
15 This argument seems rather questionable since there currently still does not exist an internal market for services
that are already harmonised throughout Europe (eg 2G and 3G services). Various obligations ranging from national
roaming obligations to interconnection tariffs are highly diverging throughout the EU. A harmonisation at the EU
implies a solution for all of these differences besides technical parameters, which might prove to be a slow and
difficult process.
16 Including terrestrial mobile communication services (public services such as 2G and 3G, and closed ones such as
PMR and PAMR), terrestrial fixed-wireless communication services (such as WLL, BWA and microwave links) and
terrestrial TV and radio broadcast services. Interestingly, Public Service Broadcasting is not excluded from this:
“While the special nature of public service broadcasting has to be taken into account, it should be recognised that
the possibility for spectrum users to trade and use the frequencies in a more flexible way are options and not
obligations. It may also be necessary to reassess the assumption that broadcasting as a public interest
automatically requires terrestrial spectrum, since coverage obligations increasingly can be fulfilled by means other
than terrestrial wireless transmission, given the growing reality of convergence and multiple platforms. This does
not contradict the objective to safeguard the delivery of public service broadcasting, nor the continuing validity of
other public policy objectives.”
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aspect deals with transitory issues, ie the safeguarding of existing licence holders’
interests (eg by giving them increased flexibility of use) and compatibility with
competition and general community law, while a fourth is concerned with the
definition of spectrum rights. The necessary co-ordination of information through
the creation of Europe-wide databases for allocations, assignments, spectrum
availability and regulations
17
is a fifth priority for harmonisation. A final issue is
service and technology neutrality wherever consumer demands (eg interoperability)
do not justify limitations on these concepts. The Commission proposes to include the
issues of tradeability (1st) and technological and service neutrality (6th) during its
framework review, whereas a co-ordination process will be started to reach the other
four objectives.
18  
(European Commission 2005)
At the time of writing of this article, the Commission has proposed no specific
measures. As of November 2006, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy of
the European Parliament, supported by opinions from the Culture and Education
and of the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committees, had only
published a draft report, entitled Towards a European Policy on the Radio Spectrum
(European Parliament 2006a, 2006b, 2006c)
THE ROAD TO WAPECS
Besides spectrum tradeability, the concept of technology and service neutral
frequency assignment and change of frequency usage is another significant policy
evolution with regard to the introduction of software-defined radio and
reconfigurable networks. In June 2004, the European Commission issued a request
for opinion to the RSPG with regard to a coordinated EU spectrum policy approach
19
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17 Possibly through the EFIS database.
18 To this needs to be added that several Member States, while sharing the views of the EC on the objective, ie to
optimise spectrum management, have diverging views with respect to the means that should be employed to reach
such optimal use of the spectrum. For example, some regulators feel that public interest objectives such as the need
to protect users from harmful interference, are not necessarily considered compatible with an exclusive market
based spectrum management. Similarly, the claim of the EC to significantly increase the amount of “commons
bands”, according to some of these regulators, is challenged by the fact that it would certainly lead to sharing and
compatibility issues, at least as long as smarter technologies (including cognitive radio) are not available to make
sure that these difficulties would not arise. A third point of criticism is that market based mechanisms cannot
ensure the availability of harmonised frequency bands at the European level while such possibility of harmonisation
is necessary for industry to develop new and innovative services and applications. Finally, some of the regulators
also believe that present regulation provides enough guarantees in terms of technology neutrality, and fear that
reinforced provisions will lead to either an inefficient use of the spectrum or to harmful interference. This
demonstrates the point made earlier that a “European” spectrum policy is in reality hard to define.
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concerning wireless access platforms for electronic communications services
(WAPECS) (European Commission 2004b). This move was spurred not only by the
fact that more and more wireless technologies were becoming available for which
suitable spectrum needed to be found (802.11x, 802.16, UMTS-HSDPA, LTE, DAB and
the DVB family, just to name a few), but also it was felt
19
that present spectrum
policies could be made more flexible, with less stringent licencing schemes attached
to the use of numerous frequency bands, so as to encourage fast introduction of
innovative and competitive services and, thus, facilitate the development of the
internal market.
20
Several evolutions and pressures from diverse major stakeholders reinforced this
argument. Firstly, ‘traditional’ 2G and 3G wireless communications operators were
among the first to call for reforms: while the first 2G licences were approaching their
expiry date (in 2005), operators in the 900 and 1800 MHz bands had already been
asking for more flexibility in these bands, in order to upgrade their networks to
hybrid 2G / 3G standards. Secondly, other services such as PAMR
21
started using
technologies that were increasingly hard to distinguish from 3G – 3G-like
applications started to be operated in bands originally allocated to PAMR. Thirdly,
convergence between mobile communications and broadcasting (where the former
started to include point-to-multipoint audiovisual services, and the latter enriched
its content with data for interactive applications) resulted in a desire by operators
of mobile technologies to use broadcasting frequencies and vice versa, eg to provide
a return path. Finally, some Member States as well as progressive spectrum
administrations outside of the EU were already contemplating more flexible
approaches to spectrum management, and some had even started implementing
measures.
22
(RSPG 2005a) In the US, for example, the FCC argued as early as 1997
that “in order for competition to bring consumers the highest valued services in the
most efficient manner, we believe competing users of spectrum need flexibility to
respond to market forces and demands. This flexibility includes the freedom to
determine how they will use spectrum, how much spectrum they need, and the
geographic area in which they will provide service” (Rosston & Steinberg 1997:10).
20
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19 At least, by the Commission although not shared by all stakeholders.
20 Hence the rationale for EU initiative in this domain.
21 Originally meant only for push-to-talk, point-to-multipoint communication systems between closed user groups,
mainly used by public services.
22 This clearly illustrates the introductory point that policy making in this domain is a mixture of proactive and
reactive regulation.
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A similar stance was taken in the FCC’s 1999 Spectrum Policy Statement (FCC
1999:3) and in 2002, the Commission’s Spectrum Efficiency Working Group again
recommended that the FCC take steps towards flexible spectrum use (FCC 2002:21).
In the mean time the FCC, authorised by the Communications Act to do so (WIK
2006:104) has already introduced such flexible uses, for example in the 2500-
2520/2670-2690 MHz, 2 GHz and L bands.
23
Also, change of use between 2G, 3G and
even B3G (beyond 3G) services is already perfectly possible in the US, due to very
flexible licences for these services. (WIK 2006:109-110). In the UK, Ofcom first
launched a consultation on Spectrum Trading and Liberalisation in November 2003,
and subsequently started its Spectrum Framework Review (end 2004), which
proposed “making licences more inherently flexible by removing unnecessary or
disproportionate restrictions so users could change use or technology without
applying to Ofcom” (Ofcom 2005b:32). The UK regulator believes that up to 72% of
spectrum may be liberalised in this manner, “allowing change of use of spectrum
without any intervention and with no specific restrictions, although possible usage
will be limited through the use of a spectrum mask” (Ofcom 2005c:51).
24
In the
beginning of 2005, the regulator published its Spectrum Framework Review
Implementation Plan. In this report, while still wholeheartedly supporting the
evolution towards flexibility in spectrum usage and announcing that it would in the
future remove restrictions in existing as well as new licences as much as possible,
Ofcom did discern two issues which justify a temporary delay of usage restrictions
removal as far as 3G licences are concerned, the first being the sheer magnitude of
change that spectrum management is currently undergoing and possible short-term
negative effects of this change on the commercial plans of the five existing mobile
network operators, and the second being that certain frequencies had recently been
auctioned to fixed services and that the terms of this auction – at least for a limited
period of time – needed to be respected. In practice, several options for the
introduction of these principles were put forward, including immediate release of
restrictions, and transitory periods to respectively 2007 and 2015; similar sets of
21
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23 FCC examples: http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-215235A1.pdf, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/-
attachmatch/FCC-01-256A1.pdf quoted in Report of the Spectrum Efficiency Working Group.
24 This would imply a two-fold set of spectrum usage rights, one “restrictive” minimal set to which all operators need
to apply, and one set of “specific” usage rights which apply to the current use of the spectrum and are less
demanding than the restrictive set, but need to be agreed with neighbouring spectrum users on an ad-hoc basis.
(Cf. Annex D of the Spectrum Framework Review report). One might wonder how efficient such a system will be
in practice, noting that spectrum users might have to negotiate with their own competitors on suitable protection
masks before being able to sell their spectrum to third parties.
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options (five in total) where outlined for the 2G bands (Ofcom 2005c). In a
subsequent 2006 consultation on Spectrum Usage Rights, Ofcom set out detailed
options for introducing liberalisation in this field, as well as a three-phased
approach to this introduction (see Figure 1, taken from Ofcom 2006). Finally, in
Germany the Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) commissioned a study into Flexible
Spectrum Management in 2005, concluding that “as far as possible, usage rights
should be both technology- and service-neutral” and requiring a flexible re-design of
the National Table of Frequency Allocations and the Frequency Usage plan, as well
as the definition of clear spectrum masks (WIK 2006:227-235).
FIGURE 1: OFCOM’S PHASED APPROACH TO SPECTRUM LIBERALISATION
Again, the section above is not intended to be exhaustive as to the regulatory
roadmap for dynamic spectrum management – not even within the few EU Member
States taken as an example. Instead, it illustrates that operators and regulators are
asking for and already implementing the policy reforms outlined by WAPECS.
Taking this into account, as well as the equally discussed practice of the European
Commission to cooperate with the Member States in various ways for the
formulation and implementation of its Community spectrum policy, it may come as
no surprise that WAPECS, as an EU policy, is in fact the result of intensive co-
ordination between the different stakeholders involved. First, as mentioned, the
RSPG formulated an opinion on the subject, which was finalised in November 2005
(RSPG 2005a). The Opinion starts by defining WAPECS specifically as:
22
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“…a framework for the provision of electronic communications services within a set
of frequency bands to be identified and agreed between European Union Member
States in which a range of electronic communications networks and electronic
communications services may be offered on a technology and service neutral basis,
provided that certain technical requirements to avoid interference are met, to
ensure the effective and efficient use of the spectrum, and the authorisation
conditions do not distort competition.”
The WAPECS system would thus theoretically allow any digital technology over any
platform to offer any service possible (including IP access, multimedia, multicasting,
interactive broadcasting and datacasting) over any frequency band (both licenced
and unlicenced) and / or network, while recognising that such an approach is subject
to technical co-existence requirements tailored to each specific band.
As a second step, the RSPG launched a questionnaire among its members regarding
current and intended usage of a pre-defined list of wireless platforms, aimed at
identifying the relevant frequency bands for WAPECS, the range of licencing
approaches which have or could be used, the rights that have been applied, the
obligations that have been applied and some spectrum related challenges. From this
the Group compiled a first list of broadcasting, fixed, mobile and Short Range Device
(SRD) frequency bands for which there existed reasonable consensus about their
suitability for WAPECS. Next, a public consultation was organised in order to collect
stakeholder views in order to formulate the opinion. (For a more elaborate overview
of consultation responses, see RSPG 2005b) As a consequence, the Opinion itself
contains an overview of the current constraints to WAPECS, the long-term policy
goals to be achieved as well as the challenges for Member States. As for constraints,
five are identified: 1) legacy issues arising from the method of assignment of
individual usage rights, which has resulted in differing economic values for
frequency bands and networks; 2) lack of flexibility in some existing licences,
particularly arising out of  national and international agreements and in many cases
aggravated by long licence durations;
25 
3) excessive technological prescriptions in
some licences; 4) the desire by Member States to protect certain public policy
objectives, eg Services of General Economic Interest, which among others contains
Public Service Broadcasting, as well as emergency services; 5) current use of bands
by non-communications services, eg governmental, military or scientific use. 
23
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25 An additional problem is that EU legislation currently does not allow a change of use for frequencies which have
been harmonised within the Union. This includes GSM (2G) and UMTS (3G) networks.
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The longterm policy goals in their turn may be summarised as the need to facilitate
rapid access to spectrum for new technologies in order to promote competitiveness
and innovation, to ensure a coherent authorisation scheme and to achieve
technological as well as service neutrality (RSPG 2005a:12-14).
However, the RSPG is careful in its approach to WAPECS and points out a certain
number of challenges to be addressed by the MS that justify a certain level of
continued regulation and co-ordination: 1) ensuring access to adequate amounts of
spectrum to meet the needs of consumers and business in the future environment
without disadvantaging services of general interest (such as public-sector
broadcasting) and without picking technology winners; 2) increasing flexibility and
enhancing harmonisation: removing regulatory constraints on the electronic
communications services to be offered but, where justified, keeping some on the
technologies to be used as this will facilitate identifying what appropriate minimal
technical co-existence requirements to avoid the risk of interference must be met
and maintaining the protection of other services and applications (eg governmental
services); 3) maintaining a stable and predictable regulatory framework; 4) avoiding
spectrum fragmentation where it could lead to inefficient use of spectrum, by
carefully considering the effects of the reduction of the regulatory constraints on
harmonised bands; 5) facilitating standardisation through, at least, the
establishment of a harmonised set of technical requirements for the usage of certain
frequency bands to benefit from economies of scale; 6) identifying transition
arrangements which ensure that legacy issues are dealt with smoothly.
In its opinion, the RSPG also recognised that, while the conditions of authorisation
should be equitable between similar electronic communication services potentially
operating in various frequency bands, using different technologies but which target
similar mass markets, there are still reasons which would prevent and will continue
to prevent consideration of the same access conditions to all networks. Similarly it
recalls that certain technological requirements may be imposed by Member States
or at EU level.
With regard to the implementation of WAPECS, the RSPG argued that whereas a
revolutionary, “big bang” approach would potentially distort existing services, it
would be equally unwise to wait for all existing licences to expire, and therefore
proposes that specific actions and dates for implementation be set out in detail,
leaving room for Member States to implement “earlier if they see fit and taking
account of local circumstances”. The Group, in its Opinion document, asks the
Member States (via the RSC) to take the frequency propositions made within the
24
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document as a starting point to compile a new list of suitable frequencies for
WAPECS, to identify all existing constraints to the inclusion of these frequencies, to
identify measures for improving coherence of authorisation conditions as well as
technical requirements for WAPECS, and to define implementation packages. (RSPG
2005a:14-15).
At the subsequent RSC meeting in March 2006, the European Commission proposed
a first set of bands to be further investigated by the Member States and invited the
Committee to liaise with other bodies regarding the duties conferred onto it by the
RSPG. In particular, the assistance of the Communications Committee (COCOM) for
the investigation of existing conditions to right of usage was suggested, and a
mandate to CEPT was proposed to examine the technical and operational
conditions needed to avoid harmful interference. Furthermore, the Commission
invited the RSC to collect data from its members regarding the different national
roadmaps for WAPECS and the implementation packages formulated for it, as well
as to identify its own list of frequencies eligible for inclusion into WAPECS (RSC
2006b). The liaison with COCOM and the mandate to CEPT were agreed upon by the
RSC (RSC 2006a), and a mandate was issued in July 2006. Under this mandate,
CEPT will review existing technical conditions attached to the right of usage of the
set of frequency bands identified by the RSC (to which the 900 MHz band was
added), to identify future common and minimal technical conditions for these
frequency bands, to urgently (by end 2006) look into the technical feasibility and
support for operating technologies other than GSM in the bands currently used for
2G mobile services, and to additionally investigate 1800-1805 MHz (upper ex-TFTS)
band. (European Commission 2006). An interim report on CEPT progress was
released in December 2006; among other things, the document demonstrated
considerable variation in current technical conditions attached to rights of use, and
the existence of certain degrees of flexibility in certain bands (such as the 3.5GHz,
the 470-862 MHz and current 2G bands) (RSC 2006c). CEPT activities hope to  be
completed by July 2007. In parallel, the WAPECS concept is included in the review
of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications, which has started
in 2006. 
However, the Commission has not awaited the outcome of the CEPT study and the
framework review to release a Communication on the matter, entitled Rapid Access
to Spectrum for Wireless Electronic Communications Services Through More
Flexibility. In this Communication, dated February 2007, the Commission outlines
and motivates the steps it is currently taking to introduce spectrum flexibility in an
25
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initial, coherent set of bands (repeating the steps and motivations already outlined
above) and sets out a specific outline for 2007. In general, the Commission proposes
“that a flexible, non-restrictive approach to the use of radio resources for electronic
communications services, which allows the spectrum user to choose services and
technology, should from now on be the rule, as opposed to the restrictive approach
which is often still used today. Measures which deviate from the new approach may
still be taken, but must be duly justified (eg for public safety and security) and take
into account their impact on innovation, competition, investment and social value”
26
(European Commission 2007c:5)
While still holding to the obligation to offer services within particular frequency
bands, the Commission aims to remove exclusive use of frequencies and to counter
harmful interference through the use of technology-neutral, usage conditions with
regard to channels, power limits and guard bands. Besides the earlier mentioned 2G
bands which need to be opened up for 3G services, the Commission gives the current
examples of the 2.6Ghz band desired by WiMax as well as UMTS operators and the
470-862Mhz band now used primarily for broadcasting to further show the urgent
need for introducing such steps towards flexibility.
27
Besides summarising the work currently being undertaken in the already-mentioned
initial “package” of frequency bands, the Communication announces its intention to:
1) translate its results into a Recommendation on common and minimally necessary
conditions attached to the rights of use before the end of the year (after which
minimal technical usage conditions and standards may be set through
implementation measures under the Radio Spectrum Decision and the R&TTE
Directive respectively); 2) urgently look into the GSM and 2.6GHz cases; 3) mandate
ETSI to develop adequate harmonised standards for equipment operating in flexible
bands, and 4) further consult with industry on issues of spectrum management
reform (European Commission 2007c).
CONCLUSION
This article has provided an overview of policy trends leading towards more flexible
forms of spectrum management. While it has been demonstrated that, in a number
of countries as well as on the EU level, there is a shift of policy focus from the
command-and-control model to more market based forms of spectrum management,
26
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26 An identical message was given in the concluding remarks by Ruprecht Niepold, Head of the European
Commission’s Spectrum Policy Unit, at the SPORT VIEWS final conference, Brussels, 16 March 2007.
27 These frequency bands belonging to those currently being investigated by the CEPT.
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including secondary trading and flexible use of spectrum, other mechanisms have
not been abandoned, and there is currently no consensus among regulators as to
what constitutes the optimum balance between them. Discussions between these
regulators in bodies such as the CEPT and at conferences show that, even though all
regulators are in favour of more efficient ways of dealing with increased spectrum
management complexity, many are cautious about speedy implementation of
market-based mechanisms and continue to have serious doubts about interference
issues, day-to-day manageability of such mechanisms as well as about the added
value of and possible business models for services relying on advanced spectrum
resource management techniques and opportunistic, cognitive radios. Moreover,
some manufacturers and operators (such as those united in the UMTS forum) have
expressed similar doubts, and lively debates are continuing also in the academic
community (besides the policy and regulatory documents already referred to, see for
example Benjamin 2003; Forge & Blackman 2006; Hazlett 2006; Hazlett & Spitzer
2006; Xavier & Ypsilanti 2006). At the same time, continued importance is attributed
to other mechanisms to promote innovation in telecommunications networks and
services, for example through the standardisation of technologies, the
harmonisation of frequency bands
28
and – with inclusion of these former two steps –
the introduction of unlicenced bands referred to in section II.
29
Therefore, the focus
of this article on market-driven spectrum management certainly does not imply that
this approach is uncontested or acted upon with identical vigor in all EU Member
States, but rather tries to shed light on this specific, promising aspect of spectrum
management reform. Additional regulatory, economic and business modeling studies
will need to be carried out in order to evaluate whether flexible spectrum
management is indeed feasible, profitable and innovation-inducing and will as such
dominate other management mechanisms in the future. !
27
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28 Recent examples being the 5GHz frequency band for the implementation of Wireless Access Systems including
Radio Local Area Networks (12/02/2007), the 2GHz frequency bands for the implementation of systems providing
mobile satellite services (14/02/2007) or the harmonised use of the radio spectrum for equipment using ultra-
wideband technology (UWB, 21/02/2007).
29 A topic on which the European Commission has also announced its desire to make progress in 2007 (European
Commission 2007c).
008 29 simonSAJIC 01.qxp  2008/04/03  02:27 PM  Page 27
REFERENCES
Analysys & Partners (2004) Study on options and conditions in introducing secondary trading of radio spectrum in the European
Community: final report to the European Commission.
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/radio_spectrum/docs/ref_docs/secontrad_study/secontrad_final.pdf
Benjamin, S.M. (2003) Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between Private and Public Control. New YorkUniversity Law Review, vol. 78,
no. 6, pp. 2007-2102
Coase, R. (1961). The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 1-44
Dunn, W.N. (2004) Public Policy Analysis. An Introduction. New Jersey, Pearson/Prentice Hall.
ECC (2006) Report 80: Enhancing harmonisation and introducing flexibility in the spectrum regulatory framework.
http://www.ero.dk/documentation/docs/doc98/official/pdf/ECCREP080.PDF
European Commission (2002). Commission Decision of 26 July 2002 establishing a Radio Spectrum Policy Group (2002/622/EC),
http://rspg.groups.eu.int/doc/documents/legal/rspg_decision/en.pdf
European Commission (2003) Request by the European Commission to the Radio Spectrum Policy Group for an Opinion on Secondary
Trading of Rights to use Radio Spectrum. (doc. No. RSPG03-13).
http://rspg.groups.eu.int/doc/word/rspg03_13_opinion_request_secondary_trading.doc
European Commission (2004) Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission (‘the Commission’) and the European
Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (‘CEPT’),
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/radio_spectrum/activities/cept_mou_signature.doc. (Press release:
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/133&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
(30/01/2004))
European Commission (2004) Request by the European Commission to the radio spectrum policy group for an opinion on a
coordinated EU spectrum policy approach concerning Wireless Access Platforms for Electronic Communications Services (WAPECS)
(doc. N° RSPG04-45 Rev.), http://rspg.groups.eu.int/doc/documents/meeting/rspg4/rspg04_45_opinion_wireless_rev.pdf
European Commission (2005) A market based approach to spectrum management in the European Union (COM(2005)400),
europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0400en01.pdf
European Commission (2006). Mandate to CEPT to develop least restrictive technical conditions for frequency bands addressed in the
context of WAPECS. http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/radio_spectrum/docs/current/mandates/ec_to_cept_wapecs_06_06.pdf
European Commission (2007) Information Society/Radio Spectrum Policy
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/radio_spectrum/by_topics/spect_market/index_en.htm
European Commission (2007). Information Society/Radio Spectrum Policy/Policy Outline/RSPG
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/radio_spectrum/activities/rspg_work/index_en.htm
European Commission (2007) Rapid access to spectrum for wireless electronic Communications services through more flexibility.
(COM(2007)50, 08/02/2007). http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/radio_spectrum/docs/ref_docs/com/com_50_en.pdf
European Parliament (2006a) Committee on Industry, Research and Energy – Draft Report: Towards a European policy on the radio
spectrum. (2006/2212(INI) http://www.europarl.eu.int/registre/commissions/itre/projet_rapport/2006/378599/ITRE_PR(2006)378599_EN.doc
European Parliament (2006b) Draft Opinion of the Committee on Culture and Education for the Committee on Industry, Research and
Energy on ‘Towards a European policy on radio spectrum’ (2006/2212(INI)
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/registre/commissions/cult/projet_avis/2006/378620/CULT_PA(2006)378620_EN.pdf
European Parliament (2006c). Draft Opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection for the Committee on
Industry, Research and Energy on ‘Towards a European policy on radio spectrum’ (2006/2212(INI)).
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/registre/commissions/imco/projet_avis/2006/378885/IMCO_PA(2006)378885_EN.pdf
FCC (1999) Policy statement in the matter of principles for reallocation of spectrum to encourage the development of
telecommunications technologies for the New Millennium. (FCC 99-354). http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-99-
354A1.pdf
28
the southern african journal of information and communication issue 8 2007
008 29 simonSAJIC 01.qxp  2008/04/03  02:27 PM  Page 28
FCC (2002) Spectrum Policy Task Force - Report of the Spectrum Efficiency Working Group.
www.fcc.gov/sptf/files/SEWGFinalReport_1.pdf
FCC (2003) Report and order and further notice of proposed rulemaking in the matter of promoting efficient use of spectrum through
elimination of barriers to the development of secondary markets. WT Docket 00-230.
FCC (2004) Second Report and order, order on reconsideration, and second further notice of proposed rulemaking in the matter of
promoting efficient use of spectrum through elimination of barriers to the development of secondary markets. WT Docket 00-230.
Forge, S. and Blackman, C. (2006) Spectrum for the next radio revolution: the economic and technical case for collective use. INFO, vol. 8, no. 2,
pp. 6-17
Hazlett, T.W. (2006) The spectrum allocation debate: an analysis. IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 68-74
Hazlett, T.W. and Spitzer, M.L. (2006). Advanced wireless technologies and public policy. Southern California Law Review, Vol. 79, pp. 595-665
Hogwood, B.W. and Gunn, L.A. (1984) Policy Analysis for the Real World. Oxford, University Press.
Marcus, J.S., Nett, L., Scanlan, M. Stumpf, U., Cave, M. and Pogorel, G (2005) Towards more flexible spectrum regulation. Bad Honnef, WIK
Consult
Ofcom (2005) A guide to the spectrum framework review. http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/sfr/sfr_guide.pdf
Ofcom (2005) Spectrum Framework Review. http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/sfr/sfr2/sfr.pdf
Ofcom (2005) Spectrum Framework Review: Implementation Plan. http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/sfrip/sfip/sfr-plan.pdf
Ofcom (2006) Spectrum Usage Rights: Technology and usage neutral access to the radio spectrum.
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/sur/spur.pdf
Ofcom (2007) Ofcom’s Spectrum Licensing Portal http://www.ofcom.org.uk/radiocomms/isu/ukpfa/intro
Rosston, G.L., and Steinberg, J.S. (1997) Using Market-Based Spectrum Policy to Promote the Public Interest. Federal Communications
Commission. http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering_Technology/Informal/spectrum.txt
RSC (2006) 15th Radio Spectrum Committee meeting: chairman’s summary report.
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/radio_spectrum/docs/rsc_chairman/rsc15_chairman_%20report.pdf
RSC (2006) Radio Spectrum Committee Working Document - Discussion on the implementation of WAPECS.
http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/radiospectrum/library?l=/public_documents_2006/rsc15_march_2006/rscom06-
09_wapecspdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d
RSC (2006) Working document: ECC interim report in response to the EC Mandate on WAPECS. (01/12/2006).
http://ec.europa.eu/.../policy/radio_spectrum/docs/ref_docs/rsc18_public_docs/rsc06_99_ecc_int_rep_wapecs.pdf
RSPG (2004) Consultation in the context of the development of a RSPG Opinion on the spectrum implications of switchover to digital
broadcasting http://rspg.groups.eu.int/consultations/responses_switchover/index_en.htm
RSPG (2004). The RSPG opinion on secondary trading of rights to use radio spectrum.
http://rspg.groups.eu.int/doc/documents/opinions/rspg04_54_op_sec_trading.pdf
RSPG (2005) Opinion on Wireless Access Policy for Electronic Communications Services (WAPECS) (A more flexible spectrum
management approach). http://rspg.groups.eu.int/doc/documents/opinions/rspg05_102_op_wapecs.pdf
RSPG (2005) Summary of the Analysis of Responses to RSPG Consultation on WAPECS. ComReg/Aegis.
http://rspg.groups.eu.int/doc/documents/meeting/rspg8/rspg_05_112.pdf
RSPG (2007). About Radio Spectrum Policy Group. http://rspg.groups.eu.int/
WIK (2006) Towards more flexible spectrum regulation: a study commissioned by the German Federal Network Agency (BNetzA).
Presentation at the ITU Workshop, Mainz, 21 June 2006. http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ni/multimobile/presentations/ITUscottmarcus.pdf
Xavier, P. and Ypsilanti, D. (2006). Policy issues in spectrum trading. INFO, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 34-61
29
the southern african journal of information and communication issue 8 2007
008 29 simonSAJIC 01.qxp  2008/04/03  02:27 PM  Page 29
